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Abstract. Cloud storage services have become accessible and used by everyone. Neverthe-
less, stored data are dependable on the behavior of the cloud servers, and losses and damages
often occur. One solution is to regularly audit the cloud servers in order to check the integrity
of the stored data. The Dynamic Provable Data Possession scheme with Public Verifiability
and Data Privacy presented in ACISP’15 is a straightforward design of such solution. However,
this scheme is threatened by several attacks. In this paper, we carefully recall the definition
of this scheme as well as explain how its security is dramatically menaced. Moreover, we
proposed two new constructions for Dynamic Provable Data Possession scheme with Public
Verifiability and Data Privacy based on the scheme presented in ACISP’15, one using Index
Hash Tables and one based on Merkle Hash Trees. We show that the two schemes are secure
and privacy-preserving in the random oracle model.
Keywords: Provable Data Possession, Dynamicity, Public Verifiability, Data Privacy, In-
dex Hash Tables, Merkle Hash Trees
1 Introduction
Storage systems allow everyone to upload his/her data on cloud servers, and thus avoid
keeping them on his/her own devices that have often limited storage capacity and power.
Nevertheless, storage services are susceptible to attacks or failures, and lead to possible
non-retrievable losses of the stored data. Indeed, storage systems are vulnerable to internal
and external attacks that harm the data integrity even being more powerful and reliable
than the data owner’s personal computing devices. A solution is to construct a system that
offers an efficient, frequent and secure data integrity check process to the data owner such
that the frequency of data integrity verification and the percentage of audited data should
not be limited by computational and communication costs on both cloud server’s and data
owner’s sides.
2A Provable Data Possession (PDP) enables a data owner, called the client, to verify the
integrity of his/her data stored on an untrusted cloud server, without having to retrieve
them. Informally, the client first divides his/her data into blocks, generates tags on each
block, and then forwards all these elements to the server. In order to check whether the
data are correctly stored by the server, the client sends a challenge such that the server
replies back by creating a proof of data possession. If the proof is correct, then this means
that the storage of the data is correctly done by the server; otherwise, this means that the
server is actually cheating somehow.
Natural extension features of PDP include:
1. Dynamicity (D) that enables the client to update his/her data stored on the server via
three operations (insertion, deletion and modification);
2. Public verifiability (PV) that allows a client to indirectly check that the server correctly
stores his/her data by enabling a Third Party Auditor (TPA) or everyone else to do
the audit;
3. Data privacy (DP) preservation that ensures that the contents of the stored data are
not leaked to neither the TPA nor anyone else.
We require that a Dynamic PDP (DPDP) with PV and DP system is secure at un-
trusted server, which means that the server cannot successfully generate a proof of data
possession that is correct without actually storing all the data. In addition, a DPDP with
PV and DP system should be data privacy-preserving, which means that the TPA should
not learn anything about the client’s data even by having access to the public information.
Gritti et al. [12] recently constructed an efficient and practical DPDP system with PV
and DP. However, we have found three attacks threatening this construction:
1. The replace attack enables the server to store only one block of a file m and still pass
the data integrity verification on any number of blocks;
2. The replay attack permits the server to keep the old version of a block mi and the
corresponding tag Tmi , after the client asked to modify them by sending the new version
of these elements, and still pass the data integrity verification;
3. The attack against data privacy allows the TPA to distinguish files when proceeding
the data integrity check without accessing their contents.
We then propose two solutions to overcome the adversarial issues threatening the DPDP
scheme with PV and DP in [12]. We give a first new publicly verifiable DPDP construction
based on Index Hash Tables (IHT) in the random oracle model. We prove that such scheme
is secure against replace and replay attacks as well as is data privacy-preserving according to
a model differing from the one proposed in [12]. We present a second new publicly verifiable
DPDP construction based on Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) in the random oracle model. We
demonstrate that such scheme is not vulnerable against the three attacks mentioned above.
In particular, we use the existing model given in [12] to prove that the MHT-based scheme
is data privacy-preserving.
31.1 Related Work
Ateniese et al. [1] introduced the notion of Provable Data Possession (PDP) which allows
a client to verify the integrity of his/her data stored at an untrusted server without re-
trieving the entire file. Their scheme is designed for static data and used homomorphic
authenticators as tags based on public key encryption for auditing the data file. Subse-
quently, Ateniese et al. [2] improved the efficiency of the aforementioned PDP scheme by
using symmetric keys. The resulting scheme gets lower overhead and partially supports
partial dynamic data operations. Thereafter, various PDP constructions were proposed in
the literature [26, 29, 13, 30]. Moreover, PDP schemes with the property of full dynamicity
were suggested in [7, 32, 31, 25, 15, 24]. An extension of DPDP includes version control
[10, 5] where all data changes are recorded into a repository and any version of the data
can be retrieved at any time. DPDP protocols with multi-update capability were suggested
in [8, 9]. More recently, data privacy-preserving and publicly verifiable PDP schemes were
presented in [21, 20, 23, 11, 22, 12].
A similar concept to PDP, called Proof of Retrievability (POR), was first defined by
Juels and Kaliski [14]. It allows a client to verify the integrity of his/her data stored at
an untrusted server, to correct the possible errors and to retrieve the entire file. Challenge
requests are limited and require randomly-valued check blocks that are called sentinels and
added to the file. Thereafter, Shacham and Waters [18] proposed two POR schemes built on
BLS signatures and pseudo-random functions. They achieved unlimited number of challenge
requests and public verifiability, and reduced communication overhead. Subsequent works
on distributed systems followed in [4, 3, 6], as well as POR protocols with data dynamicity
in [27, 19].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be three multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p ∈Θ(2λ) (where
λ is the security parameter). Let g1 be a generator of G1, g2 be a generator of G2 that
we denote < g1 >=G1 and < g2 >=G2. Let e :G1×G2 →GT be a bilinear map with the
following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u ∈G1,∀v ∈G2,∀a,b ∈ Zp,
e(ua,vb) = e(u,v)ab,
2. Non-degeneracy: e(g1,g2) 6= 1GT .
G1 and G2 are said to be bilinear groups if the group operation in G1×G2 and the bi-
linear map e are both efficiently computable. We can easily see that e is symmetric since
e(ga1 ,g
b
2) = e(g1,g2)
ab = e(gb1,g
a
2 ). Let GroupGen denote an algorithm that on input the se-
curity parameter λ, outputs the parameters (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) as defined above.
42.2 Assumptions
Discrete Logarithm The Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem is as follows. Let G1 be a
group of prime order p according to the security parameter λ. Let a∈R Zp and < g1 >=G1.
If A is given an instance (g1,g
a
1 ), it remains hard to extract a ∈ Zp.
The DL assumption holds if no polynomial-time adversary A has non-negligible advan-
tage in solving the DL problem.
Computational Diffie-Hellman The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is
as follows. Let G be a group of prime order p according to the security parameter λ. Let
a,b ∈R Zp and < g >= G. If A is given an instance (g,ga,gb), it remains hard to compute
gab ∈G.
The CDH assumption holds if no polynomial-time adversary A has non-negligible ad-
vantage in solving the CDH problem.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Exponent The Decisional Diffie-Hellman Exponent ((s+1)-
DDHE) problem is as follows. Let G1 and G2 be two groups of prime order p according
to the security parameter λ. Let β ∈R Zp, < g1 >= G1 and < g2 >= G2. If A is given an
instance (g1,g
β
1 , · · · ,g
βs+1
1 ,g2,g
β
2 ,Z), it remains hard to decide if either Z = g
βs+2
1 or Z is a
random element in G1.
The (s+ 1)-DDHE assumption holds if no polynomial-time adversary A has non-
negligible advantage in solving the (s+1)-DDHE problem.
2.3 Definition of DPDP Scheme with PV and DP
Let m be a data file to be stored that is divided into n blocks mi, and then each block mi
is divided into s sectors mi,j ∈ Zp, where p is a large prime.
A DPDP scheme with PV and DP is made of the following algorithms:
• KeyGen(λ)→ (pk,sk). On input the security parameter λ, output a pair of public and
secret keys (pk,sk).
• TagGen(pk,sk,mi)→ Tmi . TagGen is independently run for each block. Therefore, to
generate the tag Tm for a file m, TagGen is run n times. On inputs the public key pk, the
secret key sk and a file m = (m1, · · · ,mn), output a tag Tm = (Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn) where each
block mi has its own tag Tmi . The client sets all the blocks mi in an ordered collection F
and all the corresponding tags Tmi in an ordered collection E. He/she sends F and E to
the server and removes them from his/her local storage.
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, info= (operation, l,ml,Tml))
→ (F′,E′,ν ′). On inputs the public key pk, the previous collection F of all the blocks,
the previous collection E of all the corresponding tags, the type of the data operation to
be performed, the rank l where the data operation is performed in F, the block ml to be
5updated and the corresponding tag Tml to be updated, output the updated block collection
F′, the updated tag collection E′ and an updating proof ν ′.
For the operation:
1. Insertion: ml = m i1+i2
2
is inserted between the consecutive blocks mi1 and mi2 and
Tml = Tm i1+i2
2
is inserted between the consecutive tags Tmi1 and Tmi2 . We assume that
m i1+i2
2
and Tm i1+i2
2
were provided by the client to the server, such that Tm i1+i2
2
was
correctly computed by running TagGen.
2. Deletion: ml =mi is deleted, meaning that mi1 is followed by mi2 and Tml = Tmi is
deleted, meaning that Tmi1 is followed by Tmi2 , such that i1, i, i2 were three consecutive
ranks.
3. Modification: ml =m
′
i replaces mi and Tml = Tm′i replaces Tmi . We assume that m
′
i and
Tm′i were provided by the client to the server, such that Tm
′
i
was correctly computed
by running TagGen.
• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ 0/1. On inputs the public key pk and the updating proof ν ′ sent by
the server, output 1 if ν ′ is a correct updating proof; output 0 otherwise.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν. On inputs the public key pk, an ordered collection F ⊂ F of
blocks, a challenge chal and an ordered collection Σ⊂E which are the tags corresponding to
the blocks in F , output a proof of data possession ν for the blocks in F that are determined
by chal.
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν)→ 0/1. On inputs the public key pk, the challenge chal and the
proof of data possession ν, output 1 if ν is a correct proof of data possession for the blocks
determined by chal; output 0 otherwise.
Correctness. We require that a DPDP with PV and DP is correct if for (pk,sk) ←
KeyGen(λ), Tm←TagGen(pk,sk, m), (F′,E′,ν ′)←PerfOp (pk,F,E, info), ν←GenProof(pk,
F,chal,Σ), then 1← CheckOp(pk, ν ′) and 1← CheckProof(pk, chal,ν).
N.B. The set of ranks is [1,n] at the first upload; it then becomes (0,n+1)∩Q after
operations as in the construction in [12].
2.4 Security and Privacy Models
Security Model against the Server This model against the server is given in [12], and
follows the one proposed in [1, 7].
We consider a DPDP with PV and DP as defined above. Let a data possession game
between a challenger B and an adversary A (acting as the server) be as follows:
⋄ Setup. B runs (pk,sk)← KeyGen(λ) such that pk is given to A while sk is kept secret.
⋄ Adaptive Queries. First,A is given access to a tag generation oracle OTG.A chooses blocks
mi and gives them to B, for i ∈ [1,n]. B runs TagGen(pk,sk,mi)→ Tmi and gives them to
6A. Then, A creates two ordered collections F = {mi}i∈[1,n] of blocks and E = {Tmi}i∈[1,n]
of the corresponding tags.
Then, A is given access to a data operation performance oracle ODOP . For i ∈ [1,n],
A gives to B a block mi and infoi about the operation that A wants to perform. A also
submits two new ordered collections F′ of blocks and E′ of tags, and the updating proof
ν ′. B runs CheckOp(pk,ν ′) and replies the answer to A. If the answer is 0, then B aborts;
otherwise, it proceeds. The above interaction between A and B can be repeated. Note that
the set of ranks has changed after calls to the oracle ODOP .
⋄ Challenge. A chooses blocks m∗i and info
∗
i , for i ∈ I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q. Adaptive queries
can be again made by A, such that the first info∗i specifies a full re-write update (this
corresponds to the first time that the client sends a file to the server). B still checks the
data operations.
For i ∈ I, the final version of mi is considered such that these blocks were created
regarding the operations requested by A, and verified and accepted by B beforehand. B
sets F= {mi}i∈I of these blocks and E= {Tmi}i∈I of the corresponding tags. It then sets
two ordered collections F = {mij}ij∈I,j∈[1,k]⊂ F and Σ= {Tmij }ij∈I,j∈[1,k] ⊂E. It computes
a resulting challenge chal for F and Σ and sends it to A.
⋄ Forgery. A computes a proof of data possession ν∗ on chal. Then, B runs CheckProof(pk,
chal,ν∗) and replies the answer to A. If the answer is 1 then A wins.
The advantage of A in winning the data possession game is defined as AdvA(λ) = Pr[A
wins]. The DPDP with PV and DP is secure against the server if there is no PPT (prob-
abilistic polynomial-time) adversary A who can win the above game with non-negligible
advantage AdvA(λ).
Data Privacy Model against the TPA In a DPDP protocol, we aim to ensure that
data privacy is preserved at the verification step, meaning that data are accessible to all
but protected only via a non-cryptographic access control, and the verification process does
not leak any information on the data blocks.
First Data Privacy Model. This model is found in the literature [26, 23] to show that public
auditing systems preserve data privacy.
We consider a DPDP with PV and DP as defined above. Let the first data privacy
game between a challenger B and an adversary A (acting as the TPA) be as follows:
⋄ Setup. B runs KeyGen(λ) to generate (pk,sk) and gives pk to A, while sk is kept secret.
⋄ Queries. A is allowed to make queries as follows. A sends a file m = (m1, · · · ,mn) to
B. B computes Tm = (Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn) and gives it back to A. Then, two ordered collections
F= {mi}i∈[1,n] of blocks and E= {Tmi}i∈[1,n] of tags are created.
⋄ Challenge. A submits a challenge chal containing k≤ n ranks, the k corresponding blocks
in F and their k tags in Σ.
⋄Generation of the Proof. B computes a proof of data possession ν∗←GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)
such that the blocks in F are determined by chal and Σ contains the corresponding tags.
7A succeeds in the first data privacy game if F *F andΣ*E, and CheckProof(pk,chal,ν∗)
→ 1. The advantage of A in winning the first data privacy game is defined as AdvA(λ) =
Pr[A succeeds].
The DPDP with PV and DP is data privacy-preserving if there is no PPT adversary
A who can win the above game with non-negligible advantage AdvA(λ). This implies that
there is no A who can recover the file from a given tag tuple with non-negligible probability.
Second Data Privacy Model. This model is given in [12], and follows the one proposed in
[11, 30]. Observe that such model is based on indistinguishability.
We consider a DPDP with PV and DP as defined above. Let a second data privacy
game between a challenger B and an adversary A (acting as the TPA) be as follows:
⋄ Setup. B runs KeyGen(λ) to generate (pk,sk) and gives pk to A, while sk is kept secret.
⋄ Queries. A is allowed to make queries as follows. A sends a file m to B. B computes the
corresponding Tm and gives it to A.
⋄ Challenge. A submits two different files m0 and m1 of equal length, such that they have
not be chosen in the phase Queries, and sends them to B. B generates Tm0 and Tm1 by
running TagGen, randomly chooses a bit b ∈R {0,1} and forwards Tmb to A. Then, A sets
a challenge chal and sends it to B. B generates a proof of data possession ν∗ based on mb,
Tmb and chal, and replies to A by giving ν
∗.
⋄ Guess. Finally, A chooses a bit b′ ∈ {0,1} and wins the game if b′ = b.
The advantage of A in winning the second data privacy game is defined as AdvA(λ) =
|Pr[b′ = b]− 12 |.
The DPDP with PV and DP is data privacy-preserving if there is no PPT adversary
A who can win the above game with non-negligible advantage AdvA(λ).
3 The Three Attacks
3.1 DPDP construction with PV and DP in [12]
The DPDP scheme with PV and DP construction presented in [12] is as follows:
• KeyGen(λ)→ (pk,sk). The client runs Group- Gen(λ)→ (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) such that
on input the security parameter λ, GroupGen generates the cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT
of prime order p = p(λ) with the bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 → GT . Let < g1 >= G1 and
< g2 >=G2. Then, h1, · · · ,hs ∈R G1 and a ∈R Zp are randomly chosen. Finally, he/she sets
the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs, ga2 ) and the secret key sk = a.
• TagGen(pk,sk,mi)→ Tmi . A file m is split into n blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. Each block mi
is then split into s sectors mi,j ∈ Zp, for j ∈ [1,s]. Therefore, the file m can be seen as a
n× s matrix with elements denoted as mi,j. The client computes Tmi = (
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk =∏s
j=1h
−a·mi,j
j . Yet, he/she sets Tm = (Tm1 , · · · , Tmn) ∈G
n
1 .
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, info= (operation, l,ml,Tml))→ (F
′,E′,ν ′). The server first selects at ran-
dom uj ∈R Zp, for j ∈ [1,s], and computes Uj = h
uj
j . It also chooses at random wl ∈R Zp and
8sets cj =ml,j ·wl+uj , Cj = h
cj
j , and d=T
wl
ml
. Finally, it returns ν ′=(U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d,
wl) ∈G
2s+1
1 to the TPA.
For the operation:
1. Insertion: (l,ml,Tml) = (
i1+i2
2 ,m i1+i2
2
,
Tm i1+i2
2
);
2. Deletion: (l,ml,Tml) = (i, , ), meaning that ml and Tml are not required (the server
uses mi and Tmi that are kept on its storage to generate ν
′);
3. Modification: (l,ml,Tml) = (i,m
′
i,Tm′i).
• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ 0/1. The TPA has to check whether the following equation holds:
e(d,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Uj ,g2)
?
= e(
s∏
j=1
Cj,g2) (1)
If Eq. 1 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν. The TPA first chooses I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q, randomly chooses
|I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I .
After receiving chal, the server sets F = {mi}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks and Σ = {Tmi}i∈I ⊂ E
which are the tags corresponding to the blocks in F . It then selects at random rj ∈R Zp,
for j ∈ [1, j], and computes Rj = h
rj
j . It also sets bj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chalmi,j ·vi+ rj, Bj = h
bj
j for
j ∈ [1,s], and c=
∏
(i,vi)∈chalT
vi
mi . Finally, it returns ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs, c) ∈ G
2s+1
1
to the TPA.
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν) → 0/1. The TPA has to check whether the following equation
holds:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj,g2)
?
= e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2) (2)
If Eq. 2 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
Correctness. Given the proof of data possession ν and the updating proof ν ′, we have:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj ,g2) = e(
∏
(i,vi)
∈chal
T vimi ,g
a
2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
s∏
j=1
h
bj
j ,g2) = e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2)
e(d,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Uj,g2) = e(T
wi
mi ,g
a
2) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
uj
j ,g2)
= e(
s∏
j=1
h
cj
j ,g2) = e(
s∏
j=1
Cj,g2)
9N.B. In the construction in [12], the definition of the tag Tmi corresponding to the block
mi and enabling to remotely verify the data integrity is independent of the rank i; thus,
this begs for being used for an attack. Note that if mi = 0, then Tmi = 1 and thus, one can
trivially cheat since the tag is independent of the file.
3.2 Replace Attack
Let the server store only one block (e.g. m1) instead of n blocks as the client believes. The
TPA audits the server by sending it a challenge chal for blocks with ranks in I ⊆ [1,n] such
that |I| ≤ n. The server generates a proof of data possession on the |I| blocks m1 (instead
of the blocks defined by chal) by using |I| times the block m1 to obtain the proof of data
possession. The attack is successful if the server manages to pass the verification process
and has its proof of data possession being accepted by the TPA.
The client computes Tm = (Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn)∈G
n
1 for a file m= (m1, · · · ,mn) where Tmi =
(
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk = (
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−a for s public elements hj ∈G1 and the secret key sk= a ∈
Zp. Then, the client stores all the blocks mi in F and the tags Tmi in E, forwards these
collections to the server and deletes them from his/her local storage.
Yet, the server is asked to generate a proof of data possession ν. We assume that it only
stores m1 while it has deleted m2, · · · ,mn and we show that it can still pass the verification
process. The TPA prepares a challenge chal by choosing a set I ⊆ [1,n] (without loss of
generality, we assume that the client has not requested the server for data operations yet).
The TPA then randomly chooses |I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal= {(i,vi)}i∈I . Second,
after receiving chal, the server sets F = {m1}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks (instead of F = {mi}i∈I) and
Σ= {Tm1}i∈I ⊂E (instead ofΣ= {Tmi}i∈I). The server finally forwards ν=(R1, · · · ,Rs,B1,
· · · ,Bs, c) ∈G
2s+1
1 to the TPA, where Rj = h
rj
1 for rj ∈R Zp and Bj = h
∑
(i,vi)∈chal
m1,j ·vi+rj
j
(instead of Bj = h
∑
(i,vi)∈chal
mi,j ·vi+rj
j ) for j ∈ [1,s], and c =
∏
(i,vi)∈chalT
vi
m1 (instead of
c=
∏
(i,vi)∈chalT
vi
mi).
The TPA has to check whether the following equation holds:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj,g2)
?
= e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2) (3)
If Eq. 3 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
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Correctness. Given the proof of data possession ν, we have:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj,g2) = e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
T vim1 ,g
a
2) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
s∏
j=1
h
m1,j ·(−a)·vi
j ,g
a
2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
s∏
j=1
h
bj
j ,g2) = e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2)
Therefore, Eq. 3 holds, although the server is actually storing one block only.
N.B. This attack is not due to the dynamicity property of the scheme in [12]. Such attack
could happen even on static data.
3.3 Replay Attack
The client asks the server to replace mi with m
′
i. However, the server does not proceed and
keeps mi on its storage. Then, the TPA has to check that the operation has been correctly
done and asks the server for an updating proof ν ′. The server generates it, but using mi
instead of m′i. The attack is successful if the server manages to pass the verification process
and has ν ′ being accepted by the TPA.
A client asks the server to modify the block mi by sending m
′
i and Tm′i . However, the
server does not follow the client’s request and decides to keep mi and Tmi , and deletes m
′
i
and Tm′
i
.
The server receives i, m′i and Tm′i from the client but deletes them, and generates
the updating proof ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d) ∈ G
2s+1
1 by using mi and Tmi such that
Uj = h
uj
1 where uj ∈R Zp and Cj = h
mi,j ·wi+uj
j (instead of Cj = h
m′i,j ·wi+uj
j ) for j ∈ [1,s],
and d= Twimi (instead of d= T
wi
m′i
). It gives ν ′ to the TPA.
The TPA has to check whether the following equation holds:
e(d,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Uj ,g2)
?
= e(
s∏
j=1
Cj,g2) (4)
If Eq. 4 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
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Correctness. Given the updating proof ν ′, we have:
e(d,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Uj ,g2) = e(T
wi
mi ,g
a
2) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
uj
j ,g2)
= e(
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j ·(−a)·wi
j ,g
a
2) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
uj
j ,g2)
= e(
s∏
j=1
h
cj
j ,g2) = e(
s∏
j=1
Cj ,g2)
Therefore, Eq. 4 holds, although the server has not updated the block m′i and the corre-
sponding tag Tm′
i
.
N.B. This attack is due to the dynamicity property of the scheme in [12].
3.4 Attack against Data Privacy
The adversarial TPA and the server play the second data privacy game. The TPA gives
two equal-length blocks m0 and m1 to the server and the latter replies by sending Tmb of
mb where b ∈R {0,1} is a random bit. Then, the TPA selects a bit b
′ ∈ {0,1}. The attack
is successful if using mb′ , the TPA can discover which block mb ∈ {m0,m1} was chosen by
the server.
Letm0 = (m0,1, · · · ,m0,n) andm1 =(m1,1, · · · ,m1,n). The server computes Tmb,i = (
∏s
j=1
h
mb,i,j
j )
−sk = (
∏s
j=1h
mb,i,j
j )
−a, for b∈R {0,1} and i∈ [1,n], and gives them to the TPA. Note
that e(Tmb,i ,g2) = e((
∏s
j=1h
mb,i,j
j )
−a,g2) = e(
∏s
j=1h
mb,i,j
j ,(g
a
2)
−1). The computation of e(∏s
j=1h
mb,i,j
j ,(g
a
2 )
−1) requires only public elements. Therefore, for b′ ∈ {0,1}, the TPA is
able to generate the pairing e(
∏s
j=1h
mb′ ,i,j
j , (g
a
2)
−1) given pk and the block that it gave
to the server, and e(Tmb,i ,g2) given the tag sent by the server. Finally, the TPA compares
them. If these two pairings are equal, then b′ = b; otherwise b′ 6= b.
N.B. This attack is due to the public verifiability property of the scheme in [12] based on
the definition of the second data privacy game.
Moreover, in the proof for data privacy in [12], the analysis is wrong: the affirmation
“The probability Pr[b′ = b] must be equal to 12 since the tags Tmb,i , for i ∈ [1,n], and the
proof ν∗ are independent of the bit b.” is incorrect since Tmb,i and ν
∗ actually depend on b.
4 IHT-based DPDP scheme with PV and DP
A solution to avoid the replace attack is to embed the rank i of mi into Tmi . When the
TPA on behalf of the client checks ν generated by the server, it requires to use all the
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ranks of the challenged blocks to process the verification. Such idea was proposed for the
publicly verifiable scheme in [18].
A solution to avoid the replay attack is to embed the version number vnbi of mi into
Tmi . The first time that the client sends mi to the server, vnbi = 1 (meaning that the first
version of the block is uploaded) and is appended to i. When the client wants to modify
mi with m
′
i, he/she specifies vnbi = 2 (meaning that the second version of the block is
uploaded) and generates Tm′
i
accordingly. When the TPA on behalf of the client checks
that the block was correctly updated by the server, it has to use both i and vnbi of mi.
Moreover, we stress that the rank i of the block mi is unique. More precisely, when
a block is inserted, a new rank is created that has not been used and when a block is
modified, the rank does not change. However, when a block is deleted, its rank does not
disappear to ensure that it won’t be used for another block and thus, to let the scheme
remain secure.
4.1 IHT-based Construction
The IHT-based DPDP scheme with PV and DP construction is as follows:
• KeyGen(λ)→ (pk,sk). The client runs Group- Gen(λ)→ (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) such that
on input the security parameter λ, GroupGen generates the cyclic groups G1, G2 and GT of
prime order p= p(λ) with the bilinear map e :G1×G2 →GT . Let < g1 >=G1 and < g2 >=
G2. Let the hash function H :Q×N→G1 be a random oracle. Then, h1, · · · ,hs ∈R G1 and
a∈R Zp are randomly chosen. Finally, he/she sets the public key pk= (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2,
h1, · · · ,hs,g
a
2 ,H) and the secret key sk = a.
• TagGen(pk,sk,mi)→ Tmi . A file m is split into n blocks mi, for i ∈ [1,n]. Each block
mi is then split into s sectors mi,j ∈ Zp, for j ∈ [1,s]. Therefore, the file m can be seen
as a n× s matrix with elements denoted as mi,j. The client computes Tmi = (H(i,vnbi) ·∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk =H(i,vnbi)
−a ·
∏s
j=1h
−a·mi,j
j . Yet, he/she sets Tm = (Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn) ∈G
n
1 .
• PerfOp(pk,F,E, info= (operation, l,ml,Tml))
→ (F′,E′,ν ′). The server first selects at random uj ∈R Zp, for j ∈ [1,s], and computes
Uj = h
uj
j . It also chooses at random wl ∈R Zp and sets cj = ml,j ·wl + uj , Cj = h
cj
j for
j ∈ [1,s], and d = Twlml . Finally, it returns ν
′ = (U1, · · · ,Us, C1, · · · ,Cs,d,wl) ∈ G
2s+1
1 to the
TPA.
For the operation:
1. Insertion: (l,ml,Tml) = (
i1+i2
2 ,m i1+i2
2
,
Tm i1+i2
2
) and vnbl = vnb i1+i2
2
= 1;
2. Deletion: (l,ml,Tml) = (i, , ) and vnbl = vnbi = , meaning that ml, Tml and vnbl are
not required (the server uses mi, Tmi and vnbi that are kept on its storage to generate
ν ′);
3. Modification: (l,ml,Tml) = (i,m
′
i,Tm′i) and vnbl = vnb
′
i = vnbi+1.
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• CheckOp(pk,ν ′)→ 0/1. The TPA has to check whether the following equation holds:
e(d,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Uj ,g2)
?
= e(H(l,vnbl)
wl ,g2) · e(
s∏
j=1
Cj ,g2) (5)
If Eq. 5 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
• GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ ν. The TPA first chooses I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q, randomly chooses
|I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I .
After receiving chal, the server sets F = {mi}i∈I ⊂ F of blocks and Σ = {Tmi}i∈I ⊂ E
which are the tags corresponding to the blocks in F . It then selects at random rj ∈R Zp,
for j ∈ [1,s], and computes Rj = h
rj
j . It also sets bj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chalmi,j ·vi+ rj, Bj = h
bj
j for
j ∈ [1,s], and c=
∏
(i,vi)∈chalT
vi
mi . Finally, it returns ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs, c) ∈ G
2s+1
1
to the TPA.
• CheckProof(pk,chal,ν) → 0/1. The TPA has to check whether the following equation
holds:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj,g2)
?
= e(
∏
(i,vi)
∈chal
H(i,vnbi)
vi ,g2) · e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2) (6)
If Eq. 6 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
Correctness. Given the proof of data possession ν and the updating proof ν ′, we have:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj,g2) = e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
T vimi ,g
a
2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
(H(i,vnbi) ·
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j
j )
−a·vi ,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
H(i,vnbi)
vi ,g2) · e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2)
e(d,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Uj,g2) = e(T
wl
ml
,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
uj
j ,g2)
= e(H(l,vnbl) ·
s∏
j=1
h
ml,j
j ,g
a
2 )
−a·wl · e(
s∏
j=1
h
uj
j ,g2)
= e(H(l,vnbl)
wl ,g2) · e(
s∏
j=1
Cj,g2)
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N.B. The client or the TPA must store the values vnb locally. However, this does not incur
more burden if we consider the values vnb as bit strings.
4.2 Security and Privacy Proofs
Security Proof against the Server
Theorem 1. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ǫ against the IHT-based DPDP
scheme with PV and DP. Suppose that A makes a total of qH > 0 queries to H. Then,
there is a challenger B that solves the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and Discrete
Logarithm (DL) problems with advantage ǫ′ =O(ǫ).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants to break
the CDH and DL problems by interacting with A as follows:
⋄ KeyGen. B runs GroupGen(λ)→ (p,G,GT ,e,g). Then, it is given the CDH instance tuple
(g,ga, gb) where < g >= G, chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp and computes g1 = gx and
g2 = g
y. It also sets G1 =<g1 > and G2 =<g2 >. Note that (ga)x= ga1 , (g
b)x= gb1, (g
a)y = ga2
and (gb)y = gb2. B chooses βj ,γj ∈R Zp and sets hj = g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj for j ∈ [1,s]. Let a hash
function H :Q×N→G1 be controlled by B as follows. Upon receiving a query (il′ ,vnbil′ )
to H for some l′ ∈ [1,qH ]:
1. If ((il′ ,vnbil′ ),θl′ ,Wl′) exists in LH , return Wl′ ;
2. Otherwise, choose βj ,γj ∈R Zp and set hj = g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj for j ∈ [1,s]. For each il′ , choose
θl′ ∈R Zp at random and set
Wl′ =
g
θl′
1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi
l′
,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi
l′
,j
for a given block mil′ = (mil′ ,1, · · · ,mil′ ,s). Put ((il′ ,vnbil′ ),θl′ ,Wl′) in LH and return
Wl′ .
B sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e, g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2 ,H) and forwards it to
A. B keeps ga1 , g
b
1 and g
b
2 secret.
⋄ Adaptive Queries. A has first access to OTG as follows. It first adaptively selects blocks
mi = (mi,1, · · · ,mi,s), for i ∈ [1,n]. Then, B computes Tmi = (W ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk = (W ·∏s
j=1 h
mi,j
j )
−a, such that if ((i,vnbi),θ,W ) exists in LH , then W is used to compute Tmi .
Otherwise, θ ∈R Zp is chosen at random, W =
gθ1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j
is computed for
hj = g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj , ((i,vnbi),θ,W ) is put in LH and W is used to compute Tmi . Note that we
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have
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j
j ·H(i,vnbi) = (
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j
j ) ·
gθ1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 · (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j
=
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j ·gθ1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 · (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j
= gθ1
and so, Tmi = (H(i,vnbi) ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk = (H(i,vnbi) ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−a = (ga1)
−θ.
B gives the blocks and tags to A. The latter sets an ordered collection F = {mi}i∈[1,n]
of blocks and an ordered collection E = {Tmi }i∈[1,n] which are the tags corresponding to
the blocks in F.
A has also access to ODOP as follows. Repeatedly, A selects a block ml and the corre-
sponding infol and forwards them to B. Here, l denotes the rank where A wants the data
operation to be performed: l is equal to i1+i22 for an insertion and to i for a deletion or a
modification. We recall that only the rank is needed for a deletion and the version number
vnbl increases by 1 for a modification. Then, A outputs two new ordered collections F′
and E′, and a corresponding updating proof ν ′ = (U1, · · · ,Us,C1, · · · ,Cs,d,wl), such that
wl ∈R Zp, d= Twlml , and for j ∈ [1,s], uj ∈R Zp, Uj = h
uj
j , cj =ml,j ·wl+uj and Cj = h
cj
j . B
runs CheckOp on ν ′ and sends the answer to A. If the answer is 0, then B aborts; otherwise,
it proceeds.
⋄ Challenge. A selects m∗i and info
∗
i , for i ∈ I ⊆ (0,n+1)∩Q, and forwards them to B
who checks the data operations. In particular, the first info∗i indicates a full re-write.
B chooses a subset I ⊆ I, randomly selects |I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets chal =
{(i,vi)}i∈I . It forwards chal as a challenge to A.
⋄ Forgery. Upon receiving chal, the resulting proof of data possession on the correct stored
file m should be ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs, c) and pass the Eq. 6. However, A generates
a proof of data possession on an incorrect stored file m˜ as ν˜ = (R˜1, · · · , R˜s, B˜1, · · · , B˜s, c˜),
such that r˜j ∈R Zp, R˜j = h
r˜j
j , b˜j =
∑
(i,vi)∈chal m˜i,j · vi+ r˜j and B˜j = h
b˜j
j , for j ∈ [1,s]. It
also sets c˜=
∏
(i,vi)∈chalT
vi
m˜i
. Finally, it returns ν˜ to B. If ν˜ still pass the verification, then
A wins. Otherwise, it fails.
Analysis. We define ∆rj = r˜j−rj , ∆bj = b˜j−bj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chal(m˜i,j−mi,j)vi+∆rj and ∆µj
=
∑
(i,vi)∈chal(m˜i,j−mi,j)vi, for j ∈ [1,s]. Note that rj and bj are the elements of a honest
proof of data possession ν such that rj ∈R Zp and bj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chalmi,j ·vi+ rj where mi,j
are the actual sectors (not the ones that A claims to have).
We prove that if A can win the game, then solutions to the CDH and DL problems
are found, which contradicts the assumption that the CDH and DL problems are hard in
G and G1 respectively. Let assume that A wins the game. We recall that if A wins then
B can extract the actual blocks {mi}(i,vi)∈chal in polynomially-many interactions with A.
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Wlog, suppose that chal = {(i,vi)}, meaning the challenge contains only one block.
◦ First case (c˜ 6= c): According to Eq. 6, we have
e(
c˜
c
,g2) = e
(
Tm˜i
Tmi
,g2
)vi
= e(
s∏
j=1
h
∆µj
j ,g
−a
2 ) = e(
s∏
j=1
(g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj )∆µj ,g−a2 )
and so, we get that
e(
c˜
c
· (ga1 )
∑s
j=1
βj∆µj ,g2) = e(g
b
1,g
−a
2 )
∑s
j=1
γj∆µj
meaning that we have found the solution to the CDH problem, that is
(gb1)
a = (gx)ab = (
c˜
c
· (ga1)
∑s
j=1
βj∆µj )
−1∑s
j=1
γj∆µj
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice that not
all of the ∆µj can be zero (indeed, if µj = mi,jvi = µ˜j = m˜i,jvi for j ∈ [1,s], then c = c˜
which contradicts the hypothesis), and the γj are information theoretically hidden from A
(Pedersen commitments), so the denominator is zero only with probability 1/p, which is
negligible. Finally, since B knows the exponent x such that g1 = g
x, it can directly compute
((
c˜
c
· (ga1 )
∑s
j=1
βj∆µj )
−1∑s
j=1
γj∆µj )
1
x
and obtains gab. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the CDH problem can be
found with probability equal to 1−1/p.
◦ Second Case (c˜= c): According to Eq. 6, we have e(c˜,ga2) = e(H(i,vnbi)
vi ,g2) ·e(
∏s
j=1 B˜j ,
g2) ·e(
∏s
j=1 R˜j,g2)
−1. Since the proof ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs, c) is a correct one, we also
have e(c,ga2 ) = e(H(i,vnbi)
vi ,g2) · e(
∏s
j=1Bj, g2) · e(
∏s
j=1Rj ,g2)
−1. We recall that chal =
{(i,vi)}. From the previous analysis step, we know that c˜ = c. Therefore, we get that∏s
j=1 B˜j ·(
∏s
j=1 R˜j)
−1 =
∏s
j=1Bj ·(
∏s
j=1Rj)
−1. We can re-write as
∏s
j=1h
b˜j−r˜j
j =
∏s
j=1h
bj−rj
j
or even as
∏s
j=1h
∆bj−∆rj
j =
∏s
j=1h
∆µj
j = 1. For g1,h ∈ G1, there exists ξ ∈ Zp such that
h = gξ1 since G1 is a cyclic group. Wlog, given g1,h ∈ G1, each hj could randomly and
correctly be generated by computing hj = g
yj
1 ·h
zj ∈ G1 such that yj and zj are random
values in Zp. Then, we have 1=
∏s
j=1h
∆µj
j =
∏s
j=1(g
yj
1 ·h
zj)∆µj = g
∑s
j=1
yj ·∆µj
1 ·h
∑s
j=1
zj ·∆µj .
Clearly, we can find a solution to the DL problem. More specifically, given g1,h= g
ξ
1 ∈G1,
we can compute h = g
∑s
j=1
yj ·∆µj∑s
j=1
zj ·∆µj
1 = g
ξ
1 unless the denominator is zero. However, not all of
the ∆µj can be zero and the zj are information theoretically hidden from A, so the de-
nominator is only zero with probability 1/p, which is negligible. Thus, if A wins the game,
then a solution to the DL problem can be found with probability equal to 1−1/p.
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Therefore, for A, it is computationally infeasible to win the game and generate an in-
correct proof of data possession which can pass the verification.
The simulation of OTG is perfect. The simulation of ODOP is almost perfect unless B
aborts. This happens when the data operation was not correctly performed. As previously,
we can prove that if A can pass the updating proof, then solutions to the CDH and DL
problems are found. Following the above analysis and according to Eq. 5, if A generates an
incorrect updating proof which can pass the verification, then solutions to the CDH and
DL problems can be found with probability equal to 1− 1p respectively. Therefore, for A,
it is computationally infeasible to generate an incorrect updating proof which can pass the
verification. The proof is completed.
First Data Privacy Proof against the TPA
Theorem 2. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ǫ against the IHT-based DPDP
scheme with PV and DP. Suppose that A makes a total of qH > 0 queries to H. Then, there
is a challenger B that solves the CDH problem with advantage ǫ′ =O(ǫ).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants to break
the CDH problem by interacting with A as follows:
⋄ Setup. B runs GroupGen(λ)→ (p,G,GT ,e,g). Then, it is given the CDH instance tuple
(g,ga, gb), chooses two exponents x,y ∈ Zp and computes g1 = gx and g2 = gy. It also sets
G1 =< g1 > and G2 =< g2 >. Note that (ga)x = ga1 , (g
b)x = gb1, (g
a)y = ga2 and (g
b)y = gb2. B
chooses βj ,γj ∈R Zp and sets hj = g
βj
1 ·(g
b
1)
γj for j ∈ [1,s]. Let a hash functionH :Q×N→G1
be controlled by B as follows. Upon receiving a query (il,vnbil) to the random oracle H
for some l ∈ [1,qH ]:
1. If ((il,vnbil),θl,Wl) exists in LH , return Wl;
2. Otherwise, choose βj ,γj ∈R Zp and set hj = g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj for j ∈ [1,s]. For each il, choose
θl ∈R Zp at random and set
Wl =
gθl1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmil,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmil,j
for a given block mil = (mil,1, · · · ,mil,s). Put ((il,vnbil),θl,Wl) in LH and return Wl.
B sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e, g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2 ,H) and forwards it to
A. It keeps ga1 , g
b
1 and g
b
2 secret.
⋄ Queries. Amakes queries as follows. It first adaptively selects blocksmi= (mi,1, · · · ,mi,s),
for i∈ [1,n]. Then, B computes Tmi = (W ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk = (W ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−a, such that if
((i,vnbi),θ,W ) exists in LH , then W is used to compute Tmi . Otherwise, θ ∈R Zp is chosen
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at random, W =
gθ1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j
is computed for hj = g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj , ((i,vnbi),θ,W )
is put in LH and W is used to compute Tmi . Note that we have
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j
j ·H(i,vnbi) = (
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j
j ) ·
gθ1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 · (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j
=
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j ·gθ1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmi,j
1 · (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmi,j
= gθ1
and so, Tmi = (H(i,vnbi) ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−sk = (H(i,vnbi) ·
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−a = (ga1)
−θ.
B gives the blocks and tags to A and the latter sets two ordered collections F = {mi
}i∈[1,n] and E= {Tmi}i∈[1,n].
⋄ Challenge. A submits a challenge chal = {(i, vi)}i∈I . Wlog, we suppose there is only i in
I and we write chal= {(i,vi)}. A gives an ordered collection F = {m˜i}∩F= ∅ of the blocks
determined by chal, and an ordered collection Σ = {Tm˜i}∩E= ∅ of the corresponding tags.
Note that there are only m˜i in F and Tm˜i in Σ.
⋄ Generation of the Proof. Upon receiving chal = {(i,vi)}, F = {m˜i} and Σ = {Tm˜i},
B generates the proof of data possession ν˜ = (R˜1, · · · , R˜s, B˜1, · · · , B˜s, c˜), such that r˜j ∈R
Zp, R˜j = h
r˜j
j , b˜j =
∑
(i,vi)∈chal m˜i,j · vi + r˜j and B˜j = h
b˜j
j , for j ∈ [1,s]. It also sets c˜ =∏
(i,vi)∈chal T
vi
m˜i
.
Finally, B runs CheckProof on ν˜. If ν˜ still pass the verification, then A wins. Otherwise,
it fails.
Analysis. Given a honest filemi and the corresponding tags Tmi , let ν= (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,
Bs, c) be a honest proof of data possession that pass the verification.
We define ∆rj = r˜j−rj, ∆bj = b˜j− bj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chal(m˜i,j−mi,j)vi+∆rj = (m˜i,j−mi,j)
vi+∆rj and ∆µj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chal(m˜i,j −mi,j)vi = (m˜i,j −mi,j)vi, for j ∈ [1,s]. Note that rj
and bj are the elements of a honest proof of data possession ν such that rj ∈R Zp and
bj =
∑
(i,vi)∈chalmi,j ·vi+ rj =mi,j ·vi+ rj where mi,j are the actual sectors (not the ones
that A claims to have).
We prove that if A can win the game, then a solution to the CDH problem is found,
which contradicts the assumption that the CDH problem is hard in G. Let assume that A
wins the game.
Since Tm˜i 6= Tmi , and so c˜ 6= c, We have
e(
c˜
c
,g2) = e(
Tm˜i
Tmi
,g2)
vi = e(
s∏
j=1
h
∆µj
j ,g
−a
2 ) = e(
s∏
j=1
(g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj )∆µj ,g−a2 )
and so, we get
e(
c˜
c
· (ga1 )
∑s
j=1
βj∆µj ,g2) = e(g
b
1,g
−a
2 )
∑s
j=1
γj∆µj
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meaning that we have found the solution to the CDH problem, that is
(gb1)
a = (gx)ab = (
c˜
c
· (ga1)
∑s
j=1
βj∆µj )
−1∑s
j=1
γj∆µj
unless evaluating the exponent causes a divide-by-zero. Nevertheless, we notice that not
all of the ∆µj can be zero (indeed, if µj = µ˜j for each j ∈ [1,s], then c = c˜ which contra-
dicts the hypothesis), and the γj are information theoretically hidden from A (Pedersen
commitments), so the denominator is zero only with probability 1/p, which is negligible.
Finally, since B knows the exponent x such that g1 = g
x, it can directly compute
((
c˜
c
· (ga1 )
∑s
j=1
βj∆µj )
−1∑s
j=1
γj∆µj )
1
x
and obtains gab. Thus, if A wins the game, then a solution to the CDH problem can be
found with probability equal to 1−1/p.
4.3 Performance
We compare the IHT-based scheme with the original scheme proposed in [12]. First, the
client and TPA obviously have to store more information by keeping the IHT. Nevertheless,
we stress that in any case, the client and TPA should maintain a rank list. Indeed, they need
some information about the stored data in order to select some data blocks to be challenged.
We recall that the challenge consists of pairs of the form “(rank, random element)”. By
appending an integer and sometimes an auxiliary comment (only in case of deletions) to
each rank, the extra burden is not excessive. Therefore, such table does slightly affect the
client’s as well as TPA’s local storages. The communication between the client and TPA
rather increases since the client should send more elements to the TPA in order to keep
the table updated.
Second, the client has to perform extra computation when generating the verification
metadata: for each file block mi, he/she has to compute H(i,vnbi). However, the commu-
nication between the client and server overhead does not increase.
Third, the TPA needs to compute an extra pairing e(H(i,vnbi),g2)
wi in order to check
that the server correctly performed a data operation requested by the client. The TPA also
has to compute |I| multiplications in G1 and one extra pairing when checking the proof
of data possession: for each challenge chal = {(i, vi)}i∈I , it calculates
∏
(i,vi)∈chalH(i,vnbi)
as well as the pairing e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chalH(i,vnbi)
vi , g2). This gives a constant total of four
pairings in order to verify the data integrity instead of three, that is not a big loss in term
of efficiency and practicality.
Finally, apart the storage of a light table and computation of an extra pairing by the
TPA for the verification of both the updating proof and proof of data possession, the
new construction for the DPDP scheme with PV and DP is still practical by adopting
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asymmetric pairings to gain efficiency and by still reducing the group exponentiation and
pairing operations. In addition, this scheme still allows the TPA on behalf of the client to
request the server for a proof of data possession on as many data blocks as possible at no
extra cost, as in the scheme given in [12].
5 MHT-based DPDP scheme with PV and DP
A second solution to avoid the three attacks is to implement a MHT [17] for each file. In a
MHT, each internal node has always two children. For a leaf node ndi based on the blockmi,
the assigned value is H ′(mi), where the hash function H
′ : {0,1}∗ →G1 is seen as a random
oracle. Note that the hash values are affected to the leaf nodes in the increasing order of
the blocks: ndi and ndi+1 correspond to the hash of the blocks mi and mi+1 respectively.
A parent node of ndi and ndi+1 has a value computed as H
′(H ′(mi)||H
′(mi+1)), where ||
is the concatenation sign (for an odd rank i). The Auxiliary Authentication Information
(AAI) Ωi of a leaf node ndi for mi is a set of hash values chosen from its upper levels, so
that the root rt can be computed using (mi,Ωi).
5.1 MHT-based Construction
Let DPDP be a DPDP construction with PV and DP such as defined in Sec. 3.1 and
[12]. Let SS = (Gen,Sign,Verify) be a strongly unforgeable digital signature scheme. The
MHT-based DPDP scheme with PV and DP construction is as follows:
• MHT.KeyGen(λ) → (pk,sk). Let GroupGen(λ) → (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2) be run as fol-
lows. On input the security parameter λ, GroupGen generates the cyclic groups G1, G2
and GT of prime order p = p(λ) with the bilinear map e : G1 ×G2 → GT . Let < g1 >=
G1 and < g2 >= G2. The client runs Gen(λ)→ (pkSS,skSS) and KeyGen(λ)→ (pk,sk) =
((p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1,g2, h1, · · · ,hs,ga2 ),a), where h1, · · · ,hs ∈R G1 and a∈R Zp are randomly
chosen. The client sets his/her public key pk = (pk,pkSS) and his/her secret key sk =
(sk,skSS).
• MHT.TagGen(pk,sk,mi) → Tmi . The client runs n times TagGen(pk,sk,mi) → T
′
mi =
(
∏s
j=1 h
mi,j
j )
−sk =(
∏s
j=1h
mi,j
j )
−a for i∈ [1,n] and obtains T ′m=(T
′
m1 , · · · ,T
′
mn)∈G
n
1 . He/she
also chooses a hash function H ′ : {0,1}∗ →G1 seen as a random oracle. Then, he/she cre-
ates the MHT regarding the file m = (m1, · · · ,mn) as follows. He/she computes H
′(mi)
and assigns it to the i-th leaf for i ∈ [1,n]. He/she starts to construct the resulting MHT,
and obtains the root rt. Finally, the client runs Sign(skSS,rt)→ σrt. Using the hash values,
he/she computes the tags as Tmi =H
′(mi)
−sk ·T ′mi =H
′(mi)
−a ·
∏s
j=1h
−a·mi,j
j for i ∈ [1,n].
Then, the client stores all the blocksmi in an ordered collection F and the corresponding
tags Tmi in an ordered collection E. He/she forwards these two collections and (H
′,σrt) to
the server. Once the server receives (F,E,H ′), it generates the MHT. It sends the resulting
root rtserver to the client. Upon getting the root rtserver, the client runs Verify(pkSS,σrt,
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rtserver)→ 0/1. If 0, then the client aborts. Otherwise, he/she proceeds, deletes (F,E,σrt)
from his/her local storage and keeps H ′ for further data operations.
• MHT.PerfOp(pk,F,E,R = (operation, i), info = (mi,Tmi ,σrt′))→ (F
′,E′,rt′server). First,
the client sends a request R= (operation, i) to the server, that contains the type and rank
of the operation. Upon receiving R, the server selects the AAI Ωi that the client needs in
order to generate the root rt′ of the updated MHT, and sends it to the client. Once the
client receives Ωi, he/she first constructs the updated MHT. He/she calculates the new
root rt′ and runs Sign(skSS,rt
′)→ σrt′ . Then, the client sends info= (mi,Tmi ,σrt′) (note
that mi and Tmi are not needed for a deletion). After receiving info from the client, the
server first updates the MHT, calculates the new root rt′server and sends it to the client.
Upon getting the root rt′server, the client runs Verify(pkSS,σrt′ ,rt
′
server) → 0/1 . If 0, then
the client aborts. Otherwise, he/she proceeds and deletes (mi,Tmi ,σrt′) from his/her local
storage.
For the operation:
1. Insertion: mi0 is added beforemi by placingmi0 at the i-th leaf node, and all the blocks
from mi are shifted to leaf nodes by 1 to the right;
2. Deletion: mi is removed from the i-th leaf node and all the blocks from mi+1 are shifted
to leaf nodes by 1 to the left;
3. Modification: m′i simply replaces mi at the i-th leaf node.
• MHT.GenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→ (ν,rtserver, {H
′(mi),Ωi}i∈I). The TPA chooses a subset
I ⊆ [1,nmax] (nmax is the maximum number of blocks after operations), randomly chooses
|I| elements vi ∈R Zp and sets the challenge chal = {(i,vi)}i∈I . Then, after receiving chal
and given F = {mi}i∈I ⊂F andΣ= {Tmi}i∈I ⊂E, the server runsGenProof(pk,F,chal,Σ)→
ν such that ν = (R1, · · · ,Rs,B1, · · · ,Bs, c) ∈G
2s+1
1 , where rj ∈R Zp, Rj = h
rj
1 , bj =∑
(i,vi)∈chalmi,j · vi+ rj ∈ Zp and Bj = h
bj
j for j ∈ [1,s], and c =
∏
(i,vi)∈chalT
vi
mi . Moreover,
the server prepares the latest version of the stored root’s signature σrt provided by the
client, the root rtserver of the current MHT, the H
′(mi) and AAI Ωi for the challenged
blocks, such that the current MHT has been constructed using {H ′(mi),Ωi}i∈I . Finally, it
returns (ν,σrt, rtserver,{H
′(mi),Ωi}i∈I) to the TPA.
•MHT.CheckProof(pk, chal,ν,σrt,rtserver,{H
′ (mi),Ωi}i∈I)→ 0/1. After receiving {H
′(mi),
Ωi}i∈I from the server, the TPA first constructs the MHT and calculates the root rtTPA.
It then checks that rtserver = rtTPA. If not, then it aborts; otherwise, it runs Verify(pkSS,
σrt,rtserver)→ 0/1. If 0, then the TPA aborts. Otherwise, it proceeds and checks whether
the following equation holds:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj ,g2)
?
= e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
H ′(mi)
vi ,g2) · e(
s∏
j=1
Bj ,g2) (7)
If Eq. 7 holds, then the TPA returns 1 to the client; otherwise, it returns 0 to the client.
22
Correctness. We suppose that the correctness holds for DPDP and SS protocols. Given the
proof of data possession ν, we have:
e(c,ga2 ) · e(
s∏
j=1
Rj,g2) = e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
T vimi ,g
a
2) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
(H ′(mi) ·
s∏
j=1
h
mi,j
j )
−a·vi ,ga2) · e(
s∏
j=1
h
rj
j ,g2)
= e(
∏
(i,vi)∈chal
H ′(mi)
vi ,g2) · e(
s∏
j=1
Bj,g2)
N.B. In MHT.GenProof, since I is a subset of ranks, the server has to be given the appro-
priate {Ωi}i∈I along with {H
′(mi)}i∈I to obtain the current MHT and thus complete the
proof generation. Otherwise, the TPA won’t get the proper MHT.
5.2 Security and Privacy Proofs
Security Proof against the Server
Theorem 3. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ǫ against the MHT-based
DPDP scheme with PV and DP. Suppose that A makes a total of qH′ > 0 queries to
H ′. Then, there is a challenger B that solves the CDH and DL problems with advantage
ǫ′ =O(ǫ).
For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is a challenger B that wants to break
the CDH and DL problems by interacting with A as follows:
⋄ KeyGen. This phase is similar to the one of the proof in Sec. 4.2, except thatH ′ : {0,1}∗→
G1 is controlled by B as follows. Upon receiving a query mil to the random oracle H
′ for
some l ∈ [1,qH′ ]:
1. If (mil ,θl,Wl) exists in LH′ , return Wl;
2. Otherwise, choose βj ,γj ∈R Zp and set hj = g
βj
1 · (g
b
1)
γj for j ∈ [1,s]. For each il, choose
θl ∈R Zp at random and set
Wl =
gθl1
g
∑s
j=1
βjmil,j
1 (g
b
1)
∑s
j=1
γjmil,j
for a given block mil = (mil,1, · · · ,mil,s). Put (mil ,θl,Wl) in LH′ and return Wl.
The hash function H ′ and digital signature scheme SS are supposed to be collision
resistant and strongly unforgeable respectively. B gives A the public key pk that contains
pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e,g1, g2,h1, · · · ,hs,ga2) and pkSS ← Gen(λ). B keeps g
a
1 , g
b
1, g
b
2, skSS ←
Gen(λ) and H ′ secret.
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⋄ Adaptive Queries. This phase is similar to the one of the proof in Sec. 4.2, except the
following. During the calls toOTG, B generates the tags and then creates the MHT resulting
from mi and rt. It signs rt by running σrt ← Sign(skSS,rt). It finally gives the tags Tmi ,
their corresponding W resulting from calling H ′ and σrt to A.
During the calls to ODOP , A repeatedly selects mi and (Ri, infoi), and forwards them
to B. The signature σrt← Sign(skSS,rt
′) of the root rt′ is included in infoi. Here, i denotes
the rank where A wants the operation to be performed. Then, A outputs two new ordered
collections F′ and E′, and a new root rt′A corresponding to the updated MHT. B runs Verify
on σrt′ and rt
′
A and aborts if the answer is equal to 0; it proceeds otherwise.
⋄ Challenge. This phase is identical to the one of the security proof in Sec. 4.2, except that
info∗i , R
∗
i and i ∈ I = [1,n
′], for n′ ≥ n, are given.
⋄ Forgery. This phase is identical to the one of the security proof in Sec. 4.2 except that
we refer to Eq. 7.
Analysis. The first two parts of the analysis are identical to the ones of the security proof
in Sec. 4.2. The last part slightly changes as follows. The simulations of OTG and ODOP
are perfect. The proof is completed.
Second Data Privacy Proof against the TPA
Theorem 4. Let A be a PPT adversary that has advantage ǫ against the MHT-based
DPDP scheme with PV and DP. Suppose that A makes a total of qH′ > 0 queries to
H ′. Then, there is a challenger B that solves the (s+1)-DDHE problem with advantage
ǫ′ =O(ǫ).
We presume that the digital signature scheme SS is strongly unforgeable and the hash
function H ′ is collision resistant. For any PPT adversary A who wins the game, there is
a challenger B that wants to break the (s+1)-DDHE problem by interacting with A as
follows:
⋄ Setup. B runs GroupGen(λ)→ (p,G1,G2,GT , e,g1,g2) and receives the (s+1)-DDHE in-
stance (g1,g
β
1 , · · · ,g
βs+1
1 ,g2,g
β
2 ,Z) where<g1 >=G1 and <g2 >=G2. B sets µ=0 when Z =
gβ
s+2
1 ; otherwise, it sets µ= 1 when Z ∈R G1. Then, it randomly chooses ξ1, · · · ,ξs,ξs+1 ∈R
Zp and sets hj = (g
βj
1 )
ξj for j ∈ [1,s+1]. B also controls H ′ : {0,1}∗ →G1 as follows. Upon
receiving a query mil to the random oracle H
′ for some l ∈ [1,qH′ ]:
1. If (mil ,θl,Vl,Wl) exists in LH′ , return Vl and Wl;
2. Otherwise, choose θl ∈R Zp at random and compute Vl = g
−θl
1 and Wl = h
−θl/ξ1
1 =
g
−βξ1θl/ξ1
1 = g
−βθl
1 . Put (mil ,θl,Vl,Wl) in LH′ and return Wl.
It sets the public key pk = (p,G1,G2,GT ,e, g1,g2,h1, · · · ,hs,g
β
2 ). B has also access to SS
and runs Gen(λ) to obtain (pkSS,skSS). B sets the public key pk = (pk,pkSS) and forwards
it to A. B keeps skSS and H
′ secret. The secret sk is implicitly set as equal to β.
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⋄ Queries. A makes queries as follows. A first selects a file m= (m1, · · · ,mn) and sends it
to B. Then, B splits each block mi into s sectors mi,j. Then, it computes Tmi =W ·
∏s
j=1
g
βj ·(−β)·ξj ·mi,j
1 =W ·
∏s
j=1 g
−βj+1·ξj ·mi,j
1 and creates the MHT resulting from the file m using
V , such that if (mi,θ,V,W ) exists in LH′ , thenW is used to compute Tmi and V to construct
the MHT; otherwise, θ ∈R Zp is chosen at random, V = gθ1 and W = h
−θ/ξ1
1 are computed,
(mi,θ,V,W ) is put in LH′ and W is used to compute Tmi and V to construct the MHT. It
finally gets the corresponding root rt. It gives Tm = (Tm1 , · · · ,Tmn) and σrt← Sign(skSS,rt)
to A.
⋄ Challenge. A first gives to B two files m0 = (m0,1, · · · ,m0,n) and m1 = (m1,1, · · · ,m1,n)
of equal length and that have not been queried. B randomly selects a bit b ∈R {0,1}
and for i ∈ [1,n], splits each block mb,i into s sectors mb,i,j. Then, it computes Tmb,i =
Wb ·
∏s
j=1 g
−βj+1·ξj ·mb,i,j
1 and creates the MHT resulting from the file mb using Vb, such
that if (mb,i,θb,Vb,Wb) exists in LH′ , then (Vb,Wb) is returned; otherwise, θb ∈R Zp is
chosen at random, Vb = g
−θb
1 and Wb = h
−θb/ξ1
1 are computed, (mb,i,θb,Vb,Wb) is put in
LH′ and Wb is used to compute Tmb,i and Vb to construct the MHT. It finally gets the
corresponding root rtb. It gives the tag Tmb = (Tmb,1 , · · · ,Tmb,n) and the root’s signature
σrtb ← Sign(skSS,rtb) to A.
Wlog, A generates a challenge on one block only. It chooses a subset I = {i∗} ⊆ [1,n],
randomly chooses vi∗ ∈R Zp and sets chal = {(i∗, vi∗)}. It forwards chal as a challenge
to B. Upon receiving chal, B selects two ordered collections Fb = {mb,i∗} of blocks and
Σb = {Tmb,i∗ } which are the tags corresponding to the blocks in Fb where Tmb,i∗ =
Wb ·
∏s
j=1 g
−βj+1·mb,i∗,j ·ξj
1 . It then randomly chooses rj ∈R Zp, for j ∈ [1,s] and computes
R∗j = h
β2·rj
j = h
ξj
ξj+2
·rj
j+2 = g
βj+2·ξj ·rj
1 , for j ∈ [1,s− 1] and R
∗
s = Z
ξs·rs . It implicitly fixes
bj = β
2(mb,i∗,j ·vi∗ + rj) for j ∈ [1,s−1] by computing B
∗
j = h
bj
j =
h
β2(mb,i∗,j ·vi∗+rj)
j = h
ξj
ξj+2
(mb,i∗,j ·vi∗+rj)
j+2 =
g
βj+2·ξj(mb,i∗ ,j ·vi∗+rj)
1 , and B
∗
s = Z
ξs·mb,i∗,s·vi∗ ·Zξs·rs . It sets as well
c∗ = T vi∗mb,i∗ =W
vi∗
b ·
s∏
j=1
g
−βj+1·ξj ·mb,i∗,j ·vi∗
1 .
Finally, B returns ν∗ = (R∗1, · · · ,R
∗
s,B
∗
1 , · · · , B
∗
s , c
∗) and (Vb,Ωb,i∗), where Ωb,i∗ are the
AAI needed to create the MHT based on Vb. Note that Ωb,i∗ is generated by calling suc-
cessively H ′. This means that, in the list LH′ , we can find tuples of the form (z,θ,V,W )
such that the query z can be either mi as we defined above (meaning that mi is appended
to a leaf node) or H ′(y) that is attached to an internal node.
If µ= 0 then Z = gβ
s+2
1 . Thus, we have a valid random proof for mb. If µ= 1, then Z is
random value in G1, and so the R∗s and B
∗
s are random elements in G1 from A’s view and
the proof of data possession contains no information about mb.
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⋄ Guess. A returns a bit b′. If b = b′, B will output µ′ = 0 to indicate that it was given a
(s+1)-DDHE tuple; otherwise it will output µ′ = 1 to indicate that it was given a random
tuple.
Analysis. The tags and proof of data possession given to A are correctly distributed.
Indeed, when µ = 1, A gains no information about b. Therefore, Pr[b 6= b′|µ = 1] = 1/2.
Since B guesses µ′ = 1 when b 6= b′, then Pr[µ= µ′|µ= 1] = 1/2. If µ= 0, then A sees an
upload of mb. A’s advantage is thus negligible by definition (equal to a given ǫ). Therefore,
Pr[b 6= b′|µ= 0] = 1/2+ ǫ. Since B guesses µ′ = 0 when b= b′, we have Pr[µ= µ′|µ= 0] =
1/2+ ǫ. Tmb,i is equal to (H
′(mb,i) ·
∏s
j=1h
mb,i,j
j )
−sk where sk is implicitly set as equal to
β and the values hj ’s are correctly distributed as in the real scheme. Moreover, skSS and
H ′ are kept secret from A. Note that A does not have access to H ′ and the AAI given to
A with the proof of data possession result from calls to H ′. In addition, R∗j and B
∗
j are
statically indistinguishable with the actual outputs corresponding to m0 or m1. Thus, the
answers given to A are correctly distributed. The proof is completed.
N.B. Such security level is reached for data privacy since H ′ is kept secret by the server
and the client and so, the adversarial TPA does not have access to it.
5.3 Performance and Discussion with other existing works
We first compare the MHT-based scheme with the original one presented in [12]. The
MHT-based construction seems less practical and efficient than the construction in [12].
Communication and computation burdens appear in order to obtain the desired security
standards against the server and TPA. The communication overheads increase between the
client and server. The computation overheads for the client raise also, although the client
is limited in resources. The storage space of the server should be bigger, since it has to
create and possibly stores MHTs for each client. The TPA has to provide more computa-
tional resources for each client in order to ensure valid data integrity checks. Nevertheless,
experiments might show that the time gap between the algorithms in the scheme proposed
in [12] and the ones in the MHT-based scheme is acceptable.
The MHT is an Authenticated Data Structure (ADS) that allows the client and TPA
to check that the server correctly stores and updates the data blocks.
Erway et al. [7] proposed the first DPDP scheme. The verification of the data updates
is based on a modified ADS, called Rank-based Authentication Skip List (RASL). This
provides authentication of the data block ranks, which ensures security in regards to data
block dynamicity. However, public verifiability is not reached. Note that such ADS with
bottom-up leveling limits the insertion operations. For instance, if the leaf nodes are at
level 0, any data insertion that creates a new level below the level 0 will bring necessary
updates of all the level hash values and the client might not be able to verify.
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Wang et al. [27] first presented a DPDP with PV using MHT. However, security proofs
and technical details lacked. The authors revised the aforementioned paper [27] and pro-
posed a more complete paper [28] that focuses on dynamic and publicly verifiable PDP
systems based on BLS signatures. To achieve the dynamicity property, they employed
MHT. Nevertheless, because the check of the block ranks is not done, the server can de-
lude the client by corrupting a challenged block as follows: it is able to compute a valid
proof with other non-corrupted blocks. Thereafter, in a subsequent work [26], Wang et al.
suggested to add randomization to the above system [28], in order to guarantee that the
server cannot deduce the contents of the data files from the proofs of data possession.
Liu et al. [16] constructed a PDP protocol based on MHT with top-down leveling. Such
protocol satisfies dynamicity and public verifiability. They opted for such design to let leaf
nodes be on different levels. Thus, the client and TPA have both to remember the total
number of data blocks and check the block ranks from two directions (leftmost to rightmost
and vice versa) to ensure that the server does not delude the client with another node on
behalf of a file block during the data integrity checking process.
In this paper, the DPDP scheme with PV and DP is based on MHT with bottom-
up leveling, such that data block ranks are authenticated. Such tree-based construction
guarantees secure dynamicity and public verifiability processes as well as preservation of
data privacy, and remains practical in real environments.
6 Conclusion
We provided two solutions to solve the adversarial issues encountered in the DPDP scheme
with PV and DP proposed in [12]. These solutions manage to overcome replay attacks,
replace attacks and attacks against data privacy by embedding IHT or MHT into the
construction in [12]. We proved that the two new schemes are both secure against the
server and data privacy-preserving against the TPA in the random oracle.
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